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Systemic corruption and inefficiency within many judicial systems of
Latin America, coupled with violence and unlawfulness from these
countries, have resulted in increasing public disfranchisement toward those
systems and government in general. Vigorous judicial reform efforts are
essential for addressing these multifaceted problems, and are currently
being proposed by academics, governmental officials, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and public interest groups both within and without
Latin America. The thesis of this article is that efficient and effective
mediation programs should be an interval part of any reform effort for two
reasons. First, mediation helps parties circumvent corrupt officials and can
reduce inefficiency in the judicial system. Second, mediation programs can
foster more participatory societies by educating and changing societal
modes of communication and methods of resolving disputes.
Part H of the article provides an overview of the violence and unrest in
Latin America, while Part III discusses the inability of the current judicial
systems to stay that violence and unrest. Part IV examines the prospect of
mediation as a tool of judicial reform, analyzing mediation as an
alternative mechanisms to traditional litigation and as a means for societal
education and encouragement of democratic means of problem-solving.
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Part IV also provides descriptions of actual mediation programs in place in
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru. Many of the laws and
programs are strikingly similar to American models, yet some are uniquely
Latin American, such as Bolivia's sponsorship tradition and the Justice of
the Peace programs in Peru. Finally, Part V calls for the establishment of
various forms of mediation programs to address the problems of judicial
corruption, systemic societal violence, and public disenfranchisement with
government. In countries with a history of abuse of political power and
disincentives for public participation in the resolution of important
decisions, mediation offers a process in which individuals take back a
measure of control over his or her own destiny.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Systemic corruption and inefficiency in many judicial systems of Latin
America have resulted in widespread public mistrust and unrest. Violence
and unlawfulness continue unchecked by any rule of law, while public
disenfranchisement towards judicial systems and government in general
increases daily. Judicial reform is one step toward decreasing this violence
and unlawfulness, as well as one step toward the reinvention of democratic
governance. Democracy in this sense is not the American definition, which
"focuses on the formal institutions and elections, [but] emphasize[s] instead
the need to incorporate the 'democratization of social and economic
conditions."' 1 It is, instead, a form of government that embraces public
participation at all levels.
The thesis of this article is that efficient and effective mediation
programs established by the government should be an integral part of any
judicial reform effort. Specifically, in addition to helping parties circumvent
corrupt officials and aiding in the reduction of inefficiency in the judicial
system, mediation programs can address violence and unlawfulness in
society. Essentially, mediation programs can foster a more participatory or
democratic society by educating and changing peoples' modes of
communication or methods of resolving disputes. Mediation does this not by
suppressing conflict, but by encouraging the people involved to look upon
conflict as an opportunity to improve not only their particular situation, but
interactions within their families, their communities, and society as a whole.
Part II provides an overview of the violence and unrest in Latin America,
while Part III discusses the inability of the current judicial systems to stay
that violence and unrest. After setting up the problems regarding societal
violence and the judiciary's inability to channel that energy into constructive
I DAVID R. MARES, LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CAUSES, PREVENTION
AND RESOLUTION OF DEADLY INTRA- AND INTERSTATE CONFLICTS, 1982-1996 executive
summary (quoting Rosario Green, Nuevas Formas de Concertaci6n regional en America
Latina: El Grupo de los Ocho, INFORME ANNUAL RIAL (1988)), available at
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/mares/mrfr.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 1999).
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and democratic avenues, Part IV examines the prospect of mediation as a tool
of judicial reform. Subpart A analyzesthe theory of mediation as a tool to
provide alternative mechanisms to traditional litigation. and as a means for
societal education and encouragement of democratic means of problem-
solving. Subpart B provides descriptions of actual mediation programs in
place in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru. Finally, Part V
concludes by encouraging Latin American governments to establish various
forms of mediation programs to address the problems of judicial corruption
and systemic societal violence.
II. VIOLENCE, UNREST AND AMNESTY LAWS
Latin American societies experience profound and disturbing levels of
violence from both governmental bodies and private vigilante groups. For
example, human rights nongovernmental organizations and the United States
State Department have documented "grave abuses, including extrajudicial
killings, torture, and arbitrary arrests. ''2 Women, children, and indigenous
peoples of Latin America are particularly at risk, and are "subject to
violence, harassment, and discrimination. '3 Prison conditions often include
torture, and police abuses in general are rampant throughout the region.4
As further proof of the disparity between the persecuted and powerful of
Latin America, the countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala,
Honduras, Peru, El Salvador, and Uruguay have recently passed amnesty
statutes for governmental officials responsible for these abuses "in the name
of national reconciliation."'5 These statutes compound the problems and cause
further estrangement between the persecuted and their governments. 6 In
essence, these amnesty statutes perpetuate governmental silence regarding
human rights abuses, and may actually serve to increase public mistrust of
government and inhibit the establishment of true participatory democracies.
This public mistrust is widespread throughout Latin America and is
described in Section III. A.
2 Special Report: Human Rights Still a Serious Problem in South America Despite
Democratic Rule, NOTISUR-LATIN AM. POL. AFFAIRS, Feb. 14, 1997, 1997 WL 8654691.
3 Id.
4 See id.
5 See United Nations Human Rights Committee, NGOs DECRY IMPUNITY FOR
PERPETRATORS OF DISAPPEARANCES AND KILLINGS; CALL FOR AN END To TORTURE, Apr.
4, 1996, available at http://www.unep.org/restrict/dpi/presrel/prs04-04.009.
6Id.
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As can be expected, Latin Americans run the gamut on the issue of
"national reconciliation." For instance, Costa Rican ex-President and Nobel
Prize winner Oscar Arias Sanchez has said "it is still necessary for the Latin
American family to attain reconciliation, but not at the expense of pardoning
all of the crimes of those who committed them." 7 In contrast, Uruguayan
President Julio Maria Sanguinetti has declared "we've pardoned terrorists,
who had some responsibility for the violations of human rights, so it is
natural to have amnestied the military as well."8 However, according to
families of the victims of General Pinochet's bloody regime in Chile, "no
healthy, solid, stable democracy can build itself upon a foundation of
forgetting the most serious crimes against the right to life, integrity and
freedom."9 In other words, while "disclosure of the truth is [only] part of
ensuring that justice will be done," it is a necessary and integral requirement
of a democratic society.' 0
When analyzing the causes of violence in conflict in Latin America,
scholars generally agree that the extreme poverty and marginalization of
much of Latin American society can produce both systemic and sustained
violence, as well as "sporadic and spontaneous but extremely violent
uprisings.""l These analysts posit that this violence emerges not only under
authoritarian governments, but also under "democratic systems that fail to
provide opportunities for social, economic, and political participation.' 2
However, poverty and marginalization are not the sole causes of
violence. At a micro level, familial relationships and community institutions
that once worked to prevent and resolve conflicts are in the process of being
7 MARES, supra note I (quoting Oscar Arias Sanchez, El Mundo Despues de ]a
Guerra Fria: Los Principales Retos, PAZ Y SEGURIDAD EN LAS AMERICAS Dec. 9, 1996).
8 Id. (quoting Julio Maria Sanguinetti, in Un entretien avec le President Sanguinetti,
LE MONDE, Nov. 3-4, 1984, (cited in CHARLES GuY GILLESPIE, NEGOTIATING
DEMOCRACY 219-21, 248 (1991)).
9 Remember-Chile: General Pinochet and Human Rights Abuses, Statement by the
Group of Families of the Detained and Disappeared, July 23 1995, quoted in AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, TRANSITION AT THE CROSSROADS: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER
PINOCHET REMAIN THE CRUX (March 1996), available at http://www.remember-
chile.org.uk.
10 Remember-Chile: General Pinochet and Human Rights Abuses, Jorge Mera,
Chile: Truth and Justice Under the Democratic Government, in NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA
ED., IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 179 (1995),
available at http://www.remember-chile.org.uk (last modified Apr. 27, 2000).
11 MARES, supra note 1, at executive summary.
12 Id.
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destroyed through modernization. 13 For example, "the destruction of
extended family structures, the rural-urban migration, [and] the diaspora of
indigenous communities" exacerbate the inability of families and
communities to resolve their own problems and conflicts. 14 In the process of
urbanization, "the sense of solidarity and mutual responsibility within
families, neighborhoods, and communities is lost."' 15 Without that sense of
solidarity and mutual responsibility, people involved in conflicts are less
likely to work at resolving their problems, and more likely to resort to
unconstructive forms of dispute resolution. For example, life in villages is
much more interdependent than urban life, so that the risks of having a
neighbor one barely knows at odds with you are just not as significant as
being at odds with a neighbor your own family has known for years.
Moreover, most Latin Americans are more familiar with authoritative
regimes in which officials make decisions for them 16 than with participatory
forms of government in which citizens may make their wishes known in a
legitimate and systematic manner. The vast majority of citizens may not have
agreed with those official decisions under dictatorships or military rule, but
politically and socially they were powerless to make the decisions
themselves. In other words, the decades of authoritarian regimes of the
1970's and 1980's 17 often prevented the establishment and integration of
popular decision-making at all levels, from familial and societal to political.
When people are prevented from making their own decisions and resolving
their own problems, they are similarly prevented from learning and using
constructive forms of conflict resolution, and healthy change in society is
impossible. 18
13 See Jorge Correa Sutil, Modernization, Democratization and Judicial Systems, in
JUSTICE DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 97, 102 (Edmundo Jarquin &
Fernando Carrillo eds., 1998).
14 Id. at 102.
15 See Hans-JIrgen Brandt, The Justice of the Peace as an Alternative: Experiences
with Conciliation in Peru, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN
92, 96 (Malcolm Rowat et al. eds.) World Bank Technical Paper No. 280 (1995).
16 See Dr. Jos6 Maria Cier, President of Libra Foundation. I ENCUENTRO
INTERAMERICANO SOBRE RESOLUCION ALTERNATIVA DE DISPUTAS 12 (1993).
17 See Maria Luisa Bartolomei, The Globalization Process of Human Rights in Latin
America Versus Economic, Social and Cultural Diversity, 25 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 156,
163 (1997).
18 See Camilo A. Azcarate, Psychosocial Dynamics of the Armed Conflict in
Colombia, ONLINE JOURNAL OF PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 2.1 (March 1999),
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Although participatory governments are emerging, structural change
from authoritarianism to more participatory, but not always stable, forms of
government does not necessarily translate into systemic social change,
especially when the newer forms of government permit corruption to
continue. This disenfranchisement of the vast majority of citizens, both
current and historical, has often led to violence. For our purposes, violence in
Latin America can be separated into two broad categories: governmental
violence in the form of human rights abuses; and reactionary violence by
society in response to those abuses. While certainly not comprehensive, the
following sections provide an introduction to these abuses and acts of
violence in various countries of Latin America.
A. Argentina
Argentina maintained over twenty years of silence with regard to its
"dirty war" between 1976 and 1983, in which "more than 10,000 people
[were] kidnapped by security forces and disappeared, presumably killed, in
addition to the 4,000 confirmed dead." 19 Amnesty laws of 1986 and 1987 set
a sixty-day statute of limitations and established an irrefutable presumption
that a member of the state services, excluding the highest level commanders,
cannot be held independently liable.20
Demands from an Argentine "federal court, human rights groups,
politicians, clergy, and even the repentant torturers and killers" failed to
motivate the government to break the silence.21 Finally, in 1994 General
Martin Balza, the head of the Argentine Army, admitted to acting outside of
the law. 22 Although several other military commanders spoke of similar
"excesses," Balza was denounced by the military and called "a crook" by
available at http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/toc2l .htm. Mr. Azcarate is the Government
Programs Coordinator in the Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution.
19 Argentina: Military Apologizes for Abuses During Dirty War, Catholic Church
Follows Suit, NOTISUR-LATIN AM. POL. AFFAIRS, May 5, 1995, available at 1995 WL
2370073. Note: The National Commission on the Disappeared, established in 1983 by
then-President Raul Alfonsin, officially held this number to be 9,000. See United States
Institute of Peace, Truth Commissions Digital Collection, available at
http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html (last updated Aug. 27, 1999).
20See William W. Burke-White, Refraining Impunity: Applying Liberal
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Argentina's then-President Carlos Saul Menem.23 Earlier, President Menem
had specifically praised the military's activities, calling on Congress to
promote two naval captains who were self-professed torturers and "'not to
look back' at the bloody repression of the past, but to get on with healing
wounds and unifying the country." 24
By 1996,
confessions by certain perpetrators had finally led the armed forces to admit
some responsibility. Hundreds of children, the babies originally of people
killed in the years of terror, had been farmed out as war booty to
perpetrators of the crimes, and to others [not considered subversive]. The
rightful grandparents had no knowledge of where these children were now,
and the children themselves had lost their own identities. 25
In a claim brought by the Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo (Abuelas de
Plaza de Mayo), two hundred children were alleged to have been kidnapped,
including infants born in a military hospital. 26 Unfortunately, although the
kidnapping and disappearance of minors is specifically excluded from the
amnesty laws, the irrefutable presumption against liability alluded to earlier
nonetheless makes claims such as these extremely difficult to prosecute. 27
As of 2000, ten retired officers of the armed forces had been placed
under house arrest in connection with the alleged kidnappings.28 While the
armed forces publicly acquiesced with the prosecution of retired officers in
connection with the kidnappings, they expressed concern with officers on
active duty providing testimony or information to the courts. Army Chief Lt.
General Ricardo Brinzoni proposed instead a "reconciliation panel"
involving the army, human rights groups, and the Catholic Church that would
23 Id.
24 Argentina: President's Praise of Military Invokes Fury of Human Rights Groups,
NOTISUR-LATIN AM. POL. AFFAIRS, Nov. 11, 1994, available at 1994 WL 2244209.
25 United Nations Human Rights Committee, NGOS DECRY IMPUNITY FOR
PERPETRATORS OF DISAPPEARANCES AND KILLINGS CALL FOR AN END TO
TORTURE, Apr. 4, 1996, available at http://www.unep.org/restrict/dpi/presrel/prs04-
04.009; Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, Human Rights Developments:
Argentina, available at http://www.org/wr2kl/americas/argentina.html (last visited Sep.
28, 2001).
26 See Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, Human Rights Developments:
Argentina, available at http://www.org/wr2kl/americas/argentina.htm (last visited Sep.
28, 2001).
27 See Burke-White, supra note 20, at 492.
28 See id.
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attempt to determine the fate of these children without resort to the courts. 29
This idea drew governmental support, but it was abandoned when human
rights organizations rejected it outright.30
Argentina currently suffers extreme police brutality and violence.
Minors, alleged criminals, homosexuals, and transvestites are the targets of
this brutality, with eleven men proving they had been tortured and killed
while detained by the police in 2000 alone.31 In addition, allegations of
beating of minors by the police reached a total of 159 cases in the first seven
months of 2000.32 Despite these statistics, investigations and prosecutions of
the police are sporadic. 33
B. Bolivia
In Bolivia, eighteen military dictatorships from 1965 to 1982 resulted in
the assassination, torture, and disappearance of numerous people.34
Established in 1982 by then-President Hernin Siles Suazo, the National
Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances documented 155 cases of
disappearances during this period. 35 Various truth commissions also state the
regimes' tactics resulted in the killing of 76 persons, the forced exile of more
than 6,000, illegal detention and often torture of 14,000, and infliction of
serious bodily injury to 204.36 Recently, conflicts between the "government
and coca growers... have led to grave abuses by the government against
campesino [farm worker] activists." 37 Specifically, detainees were forcibly
transported to "remote jungle and highlands areas" and housed in inadequate
shelter, thus exposing them to a "high-risk of illness." 38 In addition, human
29 See id. Perhaps in response to public sentiment for the plaintiffs, the Supreme
Court of Argentina has refused a petition of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to





34 See Esteban Cuya, Las Comisiones de la Verdad en America Latina, available at
http://www.derechos.org/koaga/iii/l/cuya.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
35 See United States Institute of Peace, Truth Commissions Digital Collection,
available at http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2002).
36 See Cuya, supra note 34.
37 Special report, supra note 2.
38 Bolivia: Strikes End, But State of Siege Continues, NOTISUR-LATIN AM. POL.
AFFAIRS, May 12, 1995, available at 1995 WL 2370077.
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rights organizations point to the "kidnapping and torture by security forces of
Waldo Albarracin, president of the Asamblea Permanente de Derechos
Humanos de Bolivia" (Permanent Assembly of Human Rights of Bolivia) as
a chilling reminder of the relationship between Bolivian officials and human
rights organizations. 39
Finally, in 1995, in response to demonstrations by labor unions, teachers,
and campesinos (farm workers), the government called a 90-day state of
siege that prohibited all union and collective activity, "forbid[ing] citizens
[from] carry[ing] weapons, impose[d] a curfew, and allow[ed] the
government to detain people without charges." 40 According to labor union
Central Obrera Boliviana executive secretary, Oscar Salas Moya, who had
been imprisoned during the siege, the Bolivian government's response to the
demonstrations and their mass detention of union members showed that the
government "does not know how to live in a democracy, and prefers a
dictatorship." 4'
C. Brazil
Two hundred deaths attributable to Brazil's military regime (in power
from 1964 to 1985) have been reported.42 Governmental torture was
widespread during the regime, and included "near-drowning, electric shocks
to sensitive areas of the body, exposure to extreme heat or cold, and severe
beatings during extended periods of interrogation. '43 Kidnapping intended
suspects was not uncommon.44
Although Brazil became a democracy in 1985, 45 governmental violence
has continued. In conflicts between twelve million landless campesinos and
39 Special Report, supra note 2.
40 Bolivia: Strikes End, supra note 38.
41 Id.
42 See Dawn Bennett-Ingold, Latin American Democracy: Flourishing or
Floundering? 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 111, 111 (1999); see also Roseann M. Latore,
Coming Out of the Dark: Achieving Justice for Victims of Human Rights Violations by
South American Military Regimes, 25 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 419, 424-25 (2002).
43 Andrew Lee, Book Annotations, Archdiocese of Sao Paulo, Torture in Brazil: A
Shocking Report on the Pervasive use of Torture by Brazilian Military Governments,
1964-1979, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 185, 186 (1998).
44 See id. at 189.
45 See Andrea Steuer Zago & Lionel Pimentel Nobre, The Brazilian Citizen
Constitution, The Environment and Taxation, 20 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 507,
507 (1998).
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landowners between 1986 and 1996, approximately one thousand
campesinos were killed by either police or private paramilitary groups hired
by landowners.46 In a particularly grisly police confrontation in 1996,
twenty-three campesinos were killed either execution style at point-blank
range or beaten to death, while fifty more were injured. 47 An internal police
investigation found the police guilty only of "lack of discipline," and placed
the responsibility for the massacre on the surviving campesinos. 48 In 2000,
"police prevented buses carrying hundreds of [unarmed] landless workers
from entering Curitiba, capital of Parani state." 49 The officers "hurled tear
gas canisters and fired rubber bullets into the crowd," injuring two hundred
and killing one person with a live bullet.50 The inability to hold police
accountable for these atrocities is twofold: human rights violations currently
are heard in politically corrupt state courts and police violations are heard in
internal tribunals "which rarely punish officers for rights abuses." 51
According to the Catholic Comissao Pastoral da Terra, of these murders,
"only 47 cases made it to court and, of those, only five led to a conviction." 52
Highlighting these conflicts are the economic realities of rural Brazil. For
example, large farms comprised 55.2 percent of all rural property in 1996,
and were owned by 2 percent of all landowners. 53 While these farms "only
produce[d] 11 [percent] of the food consumed in the country, they receive[d]
80 [percent] of the rural bank credit."54
Violence in Brazil is not limited to rural conflicts. For example, urban
police in Sao Paulo were estimated to be responsible for the deaths of more
46 See Brazil: Police Massacre of Landless Campesinos Shocks Nation, NOTISUR-
LATIN AM. POL. AFFAIRS, Apr. 26, 1996, available at 1996 WL 8089389.
47 See id. Leaders of the labor group Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Terra
confirmed the above numbers; however, official sources put the number of deaths at
nineteen. Id.
48 Brazil: Capture of "Chico" Mendes's Killer Highlights Rural Violence, NOTISUR-
LATIN AM. POL. AFFAIRS, Aug. 2, 1996, available at 1996 WL 8089421 [hereinafter
Brazil: Capture].
49 See Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, Human Rights Developments:
Brazil, available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/americas/brazil.html (last visited Mar. 13,
2003).
50 Id.
51 Brazil: Police Massacre, supra note 46.
52 Brazil: Capture, supra note 48.
53 See id.
54 Id.
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than 1,000 people each year in 1991 and 1992. 55 In the state of Sdo Paulo
alone, police are reported to have killed 525 civilians in 1998, 664 in 1999,
and 489 in the first six months of 2000.56 Analysis of autopsy reports of 222
victims killed by gunfire in 1999 revealed that fifty-one percent had been
shot in the back while twenty-three percent had been shot five or more times,
suggesting that the killings were not the result of a legitimate use of force
during shootouts, as Brazilian authorities routinely reported. 57
In addition to state-sanctioned violence, death squads comprised of
soldiers, police, and mercenaries defend the status quo against political
insurgents, criminals, and even gangs of street children in Rio de Janeiro. 58 A
report by the Sao Paulo chapter of the Brazilian Bar Association revealed
that "the military police and death squads paid by shantytown shopkeepers
killed most of the nearly 1,000 street children slain [in Sao Paulo] in 1990." 59
Their actions are "officially tolerated, if not directly encouraged" by the
government. 60 Often,,these killings are also encouraged and appreciated by
the poor, who "feel every bit as besieged by crime, if not more so, as the rich
and middle class do."61
Nor are prisons any safer than the streets. Police massacred 111 prison
inmates at the Carandiru prison in 1992.62 In retaliation for a prison
disturbance in 2000, police at the "Americana City Jail in Sao Paulo
state.., made more than one hundred detainees strip and then run a gauntlet.
Police in two parallel lines beat the semi-naked prisoners with whips, bats,
iron bars, bottles, and other objects; afterwards, they poured vinegar and
saltwater over the prisoners' open wounds. '63 Finally, human rights groups
55 See MARES, supra note 1, at Table 4. For comparison, New York City had twenty-
seven deaths in 1991. Id.
56 See Human Rights Developments: Brazil, supra note 49.
57 See id. The report, released by the police ombudsman in July of 2001, also found
that over half of the victims had no prior criminal record. Id.
58 MARES, supra note 1, at 6.
59 Nancy Scheper-Hughes & Daniel Hoffman, Kids Out of Place, Part 2, North
American Congress on Latin America, Report on the Americas (1994), available at
http://www.pangaea.org/street-children/latin/sheper2.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
For further information regarding street children, see Brazilian journalist Gilberto
Dimenstein's book, BRAZIL: WAR ON CHILDREN (1991).
60 MARES, supra note 1, at 6.
61 Scheper-Hughes & Hoffman, supra note 59.
62 See Human Rights Developments: Brazil, supra note 49.
63 Id.
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and public prosecutors have documented numerous instances of mass
beatings in juvenile detention centers throughout Brazil. 64
Protesters have had limited success in bringing past atrocities to light.
Responses to calls for justice led Brazil to officially recognize as dead 136
missing political activists. 65 In 1995, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso
enacted a law that published the list of dead, and ensured financial
compensation for the victims' families. 66 Although the military perpetrators
of the deaths are still immune under the amnesty law, "Brazil was convinced
that the adoption of a reparation policy with regard to past events was a
moral obligation in societies that had triumphed over authoritarianism." 67
D. Chile
The Chilean Amnesty Decree Law of 1978 grants amnesty to all persons
who committed criminal offenses related to General Augusto Pinochet's
military government between September 1973 and March 1978.68 The law
"applies to both actual perpetrators and accomplices before and after the
fact," and "does not discriminate based on the motives for the crime. It
applies equally, no matter if the crimes were committed out of personal
animosity or in furtherance of state policy." 69 Furthermore, the law "has no
provisions for an investigatory body to consider the amnestied acts in a non-
criminal context. Nor does it provide a means of civil redress for victims to
seek pecuniary compensation, either from the perpetrator or from the
state."70 The United Nations has condemned the Decree, stating that it is
incompatible with "the duty of the State to investigate human rights
64 See id.
65 See United Nations Human Rights Committee, Commission Continues Debate on
Human Rights of Detainees, Efforts to End Torture, Press Release HR/CN/721 available
at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1996/19960410.hrcn73I.html (Apr. 10, 1996).
66 See id.
67 Id.
68 See United Nations Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Committee
Concludes Sixty-Fifth Session Held At Headquarters From 22 March to 9 April, Press
Release HR/CT/540 available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/
19990409.hrct540.htm (Apr. 9, 1999); Chile: Legal Brief on the Incompatibility of
Chilean Decree Law No. 2191 of 1978 with International Law, Amnesty International,
available at http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidocpdf.nsf/index/AMR220022001
ENGLISH/$File/AMR2200201 .pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
69 Burke-White, supra note 20, at 484.
70 Id. at 485.
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violations, to guarantee freedoms from such violations and to ensure that
similar violations did not occur. '71
Three years after General Pinochet was defeated in a plebiscite in 1988,
the Chilean Government's Commission for Truth and Reconciliation
presented its findings regarding his reign of terror from 1973 to 1988.72 The
Commission reported that the Pinochet military government tortured and
killed 3,197 Chileans. 73 Unofficial reports suggest a range of numbers from
5,00074 to 30,000, 75 and neither of these figures includes thousands of others
who survived "torture, arbitrary arrest or exile."'76 The Commission also
reported chilling prison conditions, in which "people were tortured with
electric shocks, choking, confinement and even animal rape."'77
Although General Pinochet has been directly connected with these
atrocities, he has not yet been tried in a court of law. Arrested in 1998 in
London, Pinochet is currently involved in a complicated case revolving
around the issues of sovereign immunity and Britain's ability to extradite
Pinochet to Spain. 78 In August of 2001, the Supreme Court of Chile affirmed
a lower court decision to remove Pinochet's immunity.79 Although
71 See Human Rights Committee Concludes, supra note 68.
72 See Remember-Chile: General Pinochet and Human Rights Abuses, The Crimes:
Pinochet 's Chile, available at http://www.remember-chile.org.ukibeginners/
index.htm#crimes (last modified Apr. 27, 2000). Commonly called the Rettig
Commission, the Commission was established by President Patricio Aylwin in 1990, and
reported its findings in 1991. Id.
73 See id.
74 MARES, supra note 1, at Table 2.
75 See Michael P. Scharf, The United States and The International Criminal Court
The ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the US.
Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 90 (2001).
76 Remember-Chile: General Pinochet and Human Rights Abuses, Letter from 31
Members of the United States House of Representatives to President Clinton (Feb. 24,
2000), available at http://www.remember-chile.org.uk/declarations/00-02-24usreps.htm
(last modified Apr. 27, 2000).
77 Remember-Chile: General Pinochet and Human Rights Abuses, The Crimes:
Pinochet's Chile, supra note 72 (citing the Rettig Commission for Truth and
Reconciliation (1991)), available at http://www.remember-chile.org.ukibeginners/
index.htm#crimes.
78 Remember-Chile: General Pinochet and Human Rights Abuses, Introduction:
Pinochet 's Arrest, available at http://www.remember-chile.org/uk/beginners/
index.htm#intro (last modified Apr. 27, 2000).
79 See Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, Human Rights Developments:
Chile, available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/americas/chile.html (last visited Mar. 13,
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Pinochet's poor health may make it unlikely a trial on the substantive issues
of the General's orders to torture and kill will commence, the removal of his
immunity has been seen as a landmark victory for human rights and rule of
law advocates. 80
Also in 2001, talks known as the Roundtable Dialogue, established by
former President Eduardo Frei, resulted in an unprecedented accord between
the military, police, human rights attorneys, and representatives of churches
and civil society.81 The accord, enacted into law by Congress, commits the
military and police to provide the fullest information possible regarding the
whereabouts of the disappeared within six months and includes an
acknowledgement by those forces of their responsibility for the atrocities
committed during Pinochet's regime.8 2
E. Colombia
In Colombia, violence has escalated into perhaps the "dirtiest war" in
Latin America. In the last forty years of confrontation between "guerrillas,
the government, the mob, paramilitaries," and drug dealers, 70,000 people
have been killed, while 600,000 have been displaced. 83 According to the
Colombian Commission of Jurists, the average number of victims of political
violence and deaths rose to fourteen per day in 2000.84 In addition to these
direct casualties, violence of everyday life in Colombia results in the murder
of over 30,000 people every year.85 Pressure tactics by guerrillas include
"periodical attacks on town which they destroy public buildings and steal
from local banks, the use of kidnapping, extortion of landowners and
merchants, ambushes, laying of personnel mines and constant bombing of oil
2001). For a detailed discussion on the maneuvering of the Chilean military and Congress
in support of Pinochet, as well as President Lagos' urging to those groups refrain from




83 Camilo A. Azcarate, Psychosocial Dynamics of the Armed Conflict in Colombia,
ONLINE JOURNAL OF PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 2.1 (March 1999), available at
http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/2_columbia.htm. Mr. Azcarate is the Government
Programs Coordinator in the Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution.
84 See Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, Human Rights Developments:
Colombia, available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k]/americas/colombia.html (last visited
Mar. 13, 2001).
85 See Azcarate, supra note 83.
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pipelines and electricity towers."'86 Guerillas and paramilitaries drove as
many as 300,000 Colombians, mostly women and children, from their homes
in 1998 alone.87 Dominican Embassy members have been kidnapped, the
Palace of Justice has been attacked, and numerous political leaders have been
assassinated.88 According to the International Commission of Jurists, thirty-
one judges, lawyers, and prosecutors were the targets of threats, intimidation,
or physical attacks in Columbia in 2000, while over one hundred other
people in the administration of justice were harassed.8 9
Official governmental response through the military has included
countless battles and failed peace talks. 90 "Government security forces have
[also] committed extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and massive internal
displacement in the name of combating paramilitaries and guerillas."91 For
example, in 1999, the army fired on civilians, including elementary school
children on a field trip.92 The "soldiers fired for forty minutes, ignoring the
screams of the adult chaperones. '93 Six children died, their deaths seemingly
justified by army commander General Jorge Mora's contention that "these
are the risks of the war we are engaged in."'94 Although a detailed analysis of
these complicated and bloody confrontations is not possible here, it suffices
to say that Colombian society lives in constant fear of these groups, and "the
violence in general is a far-reaching illness in Colombia." 95
F. Peru
In 1983, the Peruvian government transferred counterinsurgency
operations from the police to the military in an effort to subdue guerrilla
86 Id.
87 Harold Hongju Koh, Conference on Human Rights in Colombia, Medellin,
Colombia, Apr. 10, 1999, available at http://www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/1999/
990410_kohcolombia.html (last visited Sep. 28, 2001).
88 See Azcarate, supra note 83.
89 See International Commission of Jurists, Attacks on Justice 2000-Colombia,
available at http://icj.org/article.php?sid=101 (last modified Aug. 13, 2001).
90 See Azcarate, supra note 83.
91 Koh, supra note 87.
92 See Human Rights Developments: Colombia, supra note 84.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Azcarate, supra note 83.
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groups.96 In the following nine years until President Alberto Fujimoro
assumed office in 1992, human rights organizations documented over 4000
disappearances and 500 extrajudicial executions. 97 In 1995, Peru enacted the
First Amnesty Law, covering the years of 1980 to 1995.98 The law grants
amnesty to military, police, or civilian personnel who have committed
"common or military crimes, whether within the jurisdiction of civil or
military courts." 99 It has only one limitation: that the crime is "derived,
originated from, or a consequence of the fight against terrorism." 100 After a
trial court found the law inapplicable to crimes committed during the 1991
massacre at Barrios Altos, the Peruvian Congress passed the second amnesty
law in 1996.101 The second law prohibited judicial review of the first
amnesty law, declaring that "amnesty ... is a right of grace ... which can
only be granted exclusively by Congress."' 1 2 In 2001, Congress proposed a
third amnesty law to extend amnesty to human rights crimes committed since
1995.103
Although outlawed in 1998, torture remains widespread throughout Peru,
as are physical attacks and death threats against journalists. 10 4 A commission
established by President Fujimoro in 1996 recommended and secured the
release of 481 prisoners wrongly charged under antiterrorist laws; however,
the commission's mandate expired in 1999 and has not been renewed. 10 5
Human rights groups note that "more than 50 applications approved for
release by the commission await decision by the president, while four or five
times that number have been presented" by these groups, with no action
taken.106
96 See Burke-White, supra note 20, at 486. Guerilla groups include the Shining Path





101 See id. at 488.
102 Id. at 489.
103 See Human Rights Watch World Report 2001 Peru: Human Rights





OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In July of 2001, President Fujimoro "dissolved Congress and assumed
dictatorial powers."'1 7 Fujimoro's campaign for a third consecutive term was
marked by physical violence, criminal accusations, death threats against
journalists for the opposition, and physical attacks on opposition rallies. 08
During his inauguration, police "fired tear gas cartridges from moving
vehicles and roof-tops as well as from positions in the street, sometimes at
body height and directly at protesters."' 0 9 Human rights organizations and
others suspect government complicity with regard to arson of several public
buildings in the capital during the inauguration, after which armed guards
attacked "firemen and destroyed firefighting equipment, harassed journalists,
and threatened human rights observers, who were prevented from gaining
access to the scene." 110 Although no one knows the direction President
Fujimoro will take Peru, given the environment of violence and intimidation
in which he assumed his dictatorial powers, further progress in human rights
and legal reform is not expected.
G. Uruguay
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has expressed serious
concern regarding Uruguay's "Ley de Caducicad," or "Law of Expiry."'
The law imposes a statute of limitations on human rights violations
committed by the military and police during the military governments of
1973 to 1985, namely, the disappearances of 134 Uruguayans during that
time period. 1 2 Speaking for the committee, Chairman Christine Chanet of
France asserted that the law "sacrificed elements of justice for peace," and





II1 See United Nations Human Rights Committee, Press Release HR/CT/51 1,
Human Rights Committee Concludes Consideration of Report by Uruguay, United
Nations, available at http://www.un.orgfNews/Press/docs/I 998/ 19980327.
HRCT51 l.html (last modified Mar. 27, 1998); Amnesty International, URUGUAY: The
case of Sim6n Riquelo-A 25-year-struggle for truth and justice, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AMR520012001 ?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES
%5CURUGUAY (last modified July 26, 2001).
112 See id.
[Vol. 18:3 2003]
MEDIATION AS A CATALYST
justice nor peace should be allowed to suffer." 113 In response to these
criticisms, Uruguay noted that the law had been supported in a referendum
and upheld by the Supreme Court, and that with the reestablishment of basic
freedoms the issue would be addressed at a future time. 1 14
In 2000, Uruguayan president Dr. Jorge Batlle Ibdfiez established the
Comisi6n para la Paz (Peace Commission) to clarify the fate of all those
Uruguayans who "disappeared" between 1973 and 1985.115 However, the
Commission does not have the power to compel the testimony of witnesses,
and at present it has gathered only information available from international
organizations and the victim's families. 116 In addition, even if evidence
surfaces regarding the military perpetrators of those crimes, the Amnesty
Law prevents those military perpetrators from being brought to justice. 11 7
III. INABILITY OF THE CURRENT JUDICIAL SYSTEM TO STEM VIOLENCE
THROUGH ACCOUNTABILITY
La movida para mis amigos, y la ley para mis enemigos.
(Deals for my friends, the law for my enemies.)
Latin American saying
Corruption at all levels is a hallmark of many judicial systems in Latin
America, and it results in a judiciary largely unable or unwilling to bring to
justice perpetrators of the violence described above. Now that many Latin
American countries are currently undergoing long and painful transitions
from authoritarian regimes to more participatory forms of government,
judicial reform has become a priority for both national and international
113 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Press Release HR/CT/51 1, Human
Rights Committee Concludes Consideration of Report by Uruguay, United Nations,
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980327.HRCT511.html (last
modified Mar. 27, 1998).
114 See id.
115 See Amnesty International, URUGUA Y: The case of Sim6n Riquelo - A 25-year-




117 See id. However, this has not prevented the prosecution of the Uruguayan
military and police in other countries. In June 2001, Argentinean judge Rodolfo
Camicoba Corral ordered the preventive detention of three Uruguayan army officers and
one Uruguayan police officer, for their alleged involved in the disappearances of over
twenty Uruguayan citizens in Argentina in the seventies. See id.
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organizations. However, this transition stage dramatically increases
opportunities for corrupt behavior and has resulted in judicial systems riddled
with corruption and hamstrung by inefficient and ineffective
bureaucracies.1 18 Low compensation and weak monitoring systems have
traditionally been causally linked to the corruption, causing some scholars to
observe that the corruption is a rational result of weak deterrence, since
"corrupt activities occur when the marginal returns from crime exceed the
marginal returns from legal occupation by more than the expected value of
the penalty." 119 Judges who fight against that corruption not only put their
careers in jeopardy, but expose themselves and their families to serious, and
often fatal, bodily injury. 120 In Colombia, "drug dealers often give officials
the choice between plata o plomo (money or lead bullet).' 121 In addition,
Colombian judges are routinely harassed and threatened whenever they
preside over "cases involving members of the armed forces or paramilitary,
narcotics or guerilla organizations."'] 22
One Mexican commentator postulates that this corruption and
inefficiency has its origins in "the old Spanish colonial state-with its
enduring paternalism, corruption, bureaucracy, and extreme centralization,"
and can never "be exorcised completely."'123 Moreover, according to
Peruvian commentator Javier de Belafnde:
[T]here is a growing sense of judicial insecurity, of lack of protection of
citizens in the face of violence and abuse ... structural impunity for those
who violate the law ... an even louder call for respect for the fundamental
118 See Edgardo Buscaglia & Maria Dakolias, An Analysis of the Causes of
Corruption in the Judiciary, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 95, 95 (1999).
119 Id. at 97-98.
120 See William Ratliff & Edgardo Buscaglia, Judicial Reform: The Neglected
Priority in Latin America, 550 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 59, 65 (1997).
121 Id. (citing ETHAN NADELMANN, CoPs ACROSS BORDERS: THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 258, 309 (1993)).
122 Koh, supra note 87. Intimidation and threats of violence are also targeted at
Colombian witnesses and prosecutors. See id.
123 EDGARDO BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: A
FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 2 (1995) (quoting Enrique Krause, Old
Paradigms & New Openings in Latin America," Jan. 1992 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 20,
21).
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rights and public freedoms... and justice has remained bound to the
structure of colonial society. 124
Without a strong judicial system that fairly enforces rational laws, the
economic, social, and political framework of democratic government and
society will be undermined. 125 Minister Marcos Aburto Ochoa, President of
the Supreme Court of Chile, has said that "people can survive without
wealth, and even without good health; they may live badly, but they will
survive. What they cannot do is live without justice. Justice is part and parcel
of the quality of life-and is the most urgent issue facing the world
today."126
The hypothesis of this article is that mediation can address some of the
problems of corruption, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness. This section
provides, a discussion and analysis of how the current corruption,
inefficiency, and ineffectiveness of Latin American judicial systems was
established under authoritative regimes, and is maintained under the current
transitional democracies. Specifically, Subpart A discusses the public
mistrust of the judicial system. Subpart B then analyzes the underlying
reasons for this mistrust, i.e. the causes of current corruption of the judiciary
and court officials. In addition, B.1 concerns the inherent administrative
problems relating to court inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and shows how
the judicial system as currently administrated reinforces and institutionalizes
inefficiency. Subpart B.2 then describes the lack of judicial independence,
and provides possible political and procedural reasons for this judicial
subjugation.
A. Public mistrust
Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil has theorized, "[o]ver time, in a
democracy, the people will comply only if they trust and respect the courts as
124 Luis Pisara, Judicial Reform and Civil Society, in JUSTICE DELAYED: JUDICIAL
REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 83, 85 (Edmundo Jarquin & Fernando Carrillo eds., 1998)
(quoting Javier de Belafinde, Institucionalidid jurisdiccional del Poder Judicial, in
NUEVAS PERSPECTIVAS PARA LA REFORMA INTEGRAL DE LA ADMINISTRACI)N DE JUSTICIA
EN EL PERO (1994)).
125 See Ratliff & Buscaglia, supra note 120, at 60.
126 Luis Manriquez Reyes, Modernization of Judicial Systems in Developing
Countries: The Case of Chile, 195-96, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICAN AND THE
CARIBBEAN (Malcolm Rowat et al., eds.), World Bank Technical Paper No. 280 (1995).
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institutions." 127 Without trust in the judiciary, societies have no reliable
methods "to ensure that the other institutions can be held accountable," and
will therefore have no reason to trust the so-called "democratic" governments
in general. 128 Perception of the judiciary as incorruptible is therefore
essential to a well-run democratic system, since if the judiciary "or other
groups are perceived as being exempt or above the laws ... the legitimacy
accorded it by the people, will be seriously lacking." 129 Accordingly,
increasing the public's trust and respect in the judiciary by rooting out
corruption and ineffectiveness must be a fundamental element of any judicial
reform program. 1 30
Unfortunately, "a world competitiveness report that rates judicial
systems of the world not only on the basis of efficiency but also on the
opinions of users and public confidence, puts all Latin American systems
except Chile's in the bottom 20 percent."'131 In general, Latin Americans
view the administration of justice as "slow, tending to favor those in power,
and corrupt."'132 Specifically, surveys in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru
found that "between 55 percent and 75 percent of the public manifest a very
low opinion of the judicial sector." 133 In many countries, this makes the
judiciary "less trusted than either the national police or intelligence
services." 134
For instance, sixty-five percent of Argentineans surveyed believe that the
system was "unjust, partial, biased in favor of the rich, corrupt, above the
127 Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR Services by
Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 715, 738 (1999).
128 Buscaglia & Dakolias, supra note 118, at 111.
12 9 Id. at 111 (quoting KIMBERLY LYNN THACHUCK, PLOMO 0 PLATA: POLITICS,
CORRUPTION AND DRUG POLICY IN COLOMBIA 79 (Sept. 1997) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Simon Fraser University)).
130 See BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 3.
131 Id.
132 Pisara, supra note 124, at 83.
133 BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 5.
134 Maria Dakolias, Court Performance around the World: A Comparative
Perspective, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 87, 130 (1999) [hereinafter Court
Performance around the World] (citing Peru: Poll Shows People Do Not Trust Most
Government Institutions, FBIS, Sept. 3, 1997, available in FBIS, Doc. No. FBIS-LAT-
97-246).
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law, politicized, [and] prone to personal favors."'1 35 Even in Chile, survey
respondents described their judicial system as "bad, inefficient,
discriminatory, arbitrary and slow."'136 According to a 1989 survey by the
Corporation for University Promotion, eighty-three percent of those surveyed
"expressed a negative opinion about the justice system in general, frequently
referring to its discriminatory character."' 137 In Colombia, a public survey
ranked its judiciary "forty-fifth out of forty-six countries in a 1998 study of
public confidence in the fair administration of justice."'' 38 Another poll found
that eighty-nine percent "thought that judges were susceptible to bribes, and
eighty-five percent thought that judges did not apply the law
evenhandedly."1 39
Surveys have also found that judges are thought to be more concerned
with personal gain than justice, and the system in general is not perceived as
attracting and keeping high-quality judges and personnel. 40 In Peru, a survey
conducted in 1999 found that a full sixty-one percent lacked "confidence in
the honesty of judges.' 141 One consequence of this mistrust is the under-use
of the system to address serious abuses. For instance, Chileans and
Ecuadorians complain about corruption and abuses to the media, rather than
to the judiciary. 142 And as stated earlier in Section II, claims of human rights
abuses by Brazilian police must currently be heard either in corrupt state
courts or internal police tribunals. Of the over one thousand murders of
landless campesinos, only forty-seven cases have been brought to court, and
only five have sustained convictions. 143 In short, understandable public
mistrust in the judiciaries of Latin America permeates every aspect of that
135 Gladys Stella Alvarez, Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Lessons of
the Argentine Experience, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN
81 (Malcolm Rowat et al., eds.), World Bank Technical Paper No. 280 (1995).
136 BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 6.
137 Maria Dakolias, Legal and Judicial Development: The Role of Civil Society in
the Reform Process, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S26, S36 (2002). The Corporation for
University Promotion is a non-profit organization founded in 1968, and has conducted
numberous studies of educational and legal reforms. See id.
138 Dakolias, Court Performance around the World, supra note 134, at 115 (citing
World Economic Forum, The World Competitiveness Yearbook 1998 app. 3.41 (1998)).
139 Id. at 115 (citing interview with Alfredo Fuentes Hernandez, Executive Director
of Corporaci6n Excelencia en ]a Justicia, in BogotA, Colombia (July 28, 1998)).
140 BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 6.
141 Dakolias, Court Performance around the World, supra note 134, at 18.
142 See Buscaglia & Dakolias, supra note 118, at 101.
143 See Brazil: Capture, supra note 48.
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judicial system, and has disastrous consequences for establishing and
maintaining viable democracies.
B. Corruption of the Judicial System
In Latin America, corruption as an everyday occurrence was established
in colonial times under Spanish rule, where "venality, graft, peculation, and
personal use of public funds attended the operation of government at all
levels."'144 Defining corruption can itself be a difficult task, since acceptable
norms of behavior are often diametrically opposed to legal requirements. 145
For example, legally acceptable fees for filing a case in Latin America must
be supplemented with substantial bribes (rents) to judicial officials and
personnel. In Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela, these bribes
account for eight to twelve percent of court costs to parties. 146 Bribes have
become such an integral and expected part of the judicial systems in Latin
America that the average person, "who cannot receive a public service due to
an inability to pay the legal fee, ceases to demand the public good from the
official system."' 47
Judicial incentives for accepting and demanding these bribes range from
"low salaries, opportunities, bad working conditions, greed, tradition, and
fear."'148 These factors are compounded by "short, fixed terms," "insecure
and inadequate judicial pensions," and secret judicial appointments. 149
Finally, although Latin American systems prohibit ex parte communication
between judges and parties and their counsel, in practice judges routinely
meet with counsel to discuss their case. 150 These communications present
those judges with "almost unlimited opportunities to exact favors for their
services." 151 Fortunately, public opposition to judicial corruption has
144 Ratliff & Buscaglia, supra note 120, at 65 (quoting CHARLES GIBSON, SPAIN IN
AMERICA 107-08 (1966)).
145 Id. (quoting ETHAN NADELMANN, CoPs ACROSS BORDERS: THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 258, 309 (1993)).
146 BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 11.
147 Buscaglia & Dakolias, supra note 118, at 112 (citing Edgardo Buscaglia, An
Analysis of Corrupt Practices Within the Judiciary in Latin America, in ESSAYS IN LAW
AND ECONOMICS IV 223, 234 (Claus Ott & Georg von Wangenheim eds., 1998)).
148 Ratliff & Buscaglia, supra note 120, at 65.
149 BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 11.
150 See Roberto MacLean, The Culture of Service in the Administration of Justice, 6
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 158 (1996).
151 Ratliff & Buscaglia, supra note 120, at 65.
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increased as Latin America has begun the difficult transition from
authoritarian regimes to true participatory democracies. 152 For example,
Argentineans now rank corruption as the second most significant cause of
problems in the country.153 According to Jorge Bacque, the 1999 head of the
national bar association and former chief justice of the Supreme Court of
Argentina, "[i]t's no longer enough to talk about corruption. If substantial
changes aren't made, the judicial system will hit bottom." 154
Latin American legal scholars Buscaglia and Dakolias speculate that the
presence of the following factors increases the ability of the judiciary and
judicial personnel to extract bribes from parties and counsel wishing to use
the court system.
* Greater administrative power in the hands of fewer judges;
" Procedural complexity;
* The lack of accessible legal databases to aid in the widespread
publication of judicial opinions;
* The lack of ADR processes offered by the government; and
* The inability and unwillingness of private parties to act in concert to
prevent and abstain from bribery.155
This subsection will discuss various aspects of this judicial corruption.
Subsection B. 1 will discuss the administrative problems that give rise to and
are exacerbated by corruption, while Subsection B.2 will describe how the
current selection and retention of the judiciary acts to encourage corrupt
behavior and inhibit judicial independence. Finally, this subsection will
analyze how the lack of stare decisis and unclear jurisdictional boundaries
provide opportunities for arbitrary and corrupt decisions.
1. Administrative Problems
Administrative problems in Latin American judicial systems surround
both court administration, involving budgets and personnel, and case
management. Individual courts are invariably administered directly by
judges, yet "few are sufficiently trained in accounting and financial
152 Busgalia & Dakolias, supra note 118, at 115 (citing Robert S. Leinken,
Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1996-97, at 55,
68).
153 Busgalia & Dakolias, supra note 118, at 113.
154 Lucien 0. Chauvin et al., Justice: The Cinderella of Latin America,
Complacency in the Court, May 10, 1999, Latinamerica Press (SIRS Knowledge Source).
155 See Busgalia & Dakolias, supra note 118, at 100.
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affairs."' 56 In many countries these administrative duties account for sixty-
five to seventy-five percent of a judge's time, and cause corresponding
delays in judicial decision-making. 157 Because administrative duties account
for much of a judge's rent seeking capacity (i.e. opportunity for bribery),
most judges are unwilling to delegate these administrative responsibilities. 58
The result is "gross inefficiency in record management, case-flow and
caseload management, and maintaining case statistics and archives."' 159
Another wrinkle in this administrative problem is the fact that most
Supreme Courts of Latin America maintain control over the overall judicial
administration, often requiring lower courts "to make the simplest requests to
a centralized office." 160 The Supreme Courts also centralize judicial
budgets. 16 1 Budgets are allocated to specific courts without local input, and
are often routinely and spectacularly deficient in terms of actual caseloads. 162
For example, court staffs in Ecuador are assigned according to regulation and
"without reference to caseloads[,]" so that "in some courts there is a shortage
of personnel and others there is a surplus."' 163 Overall however, judicial
budgets are inadequate and "allow for only minimal standards of justice., 1 64
One byproduct of systemic corruption manifests itself in endless delays.
The time to disposition in Latin America has reached "unprecedented
proportions,"'165 with "[civil] cases commonly tak[ing] up to 12 years to be
resolved in court." 166 A lack of standards relating to time to disposition
exacerbates the situation, and increases the opportunities for rent seeking.' 6
7




16 0 Id. at 14.
161 Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin
America, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 191 (1995).
162 BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 14.
163 id. (citing Interview with Robert Page (June 30, 1994)).
164 Dakolias, supra note 161, at 190.
165 BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 24 (citing CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (CIA), WORLDFACT BOOK: 1994 (1994)).
166 Dakolias, supra note 161, at 170-71 (citing Edgardo Buscaglia & Maria
Dakolias, Judicial Reform in Latin American Courts: The Experience in Argentina and
Ecuador 9 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author Maria Dakolias).
167 See Buscaglia & Dakolias, supra note 118, at 103 (citing Edgardo Buscaglia &
Maria Dakolias, Judicial Reform in Latin American Courts: The Experience in Argentina
and Ecuador, WORLD BANK TECH PAPER No. 350 13 (1996)).
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According to a judicial specialist for the World Bank, delays permeate every
facet of the legal system in Latin America, and can exponentially increase
litigation costs.
In a South American country that I visited, each time users of the justice
system inquired as to the status of their case, they had to wait patiently in a
line for two hours, only to reach the window of the office and rudely be told
that the person they were looking for was not available. 168
Current case management in Latin America is marked by judicial
passivity. Over ninety percent of Chilean judges agreed that judges fail to
actively move cases through the system, and rely on counsel and litigants to
"determine the speed of litigation.' 169 Pisara postulates that adherence to
"ritualistic formalism, bureaucratic behavior, and lack of legal interpretation
all contribute" to this passivity, and results in the classic example of the
"persons held in pretrial detention who have no attorney: they will remain in
detention, and may never even get a verdict. Someone else has to 'move the
case,' for the judge will not."' 170 This means that plaintiffs are often at the
mercy of wealthy defendants who wish to delay as long as possible.
Criminal cases fare little better in Latin America. In Colombia, threats to
judges, witnesses, and prosecutors have resulted in the successful prosecution
of only three to seven percent of all crimes committed nationally.'71
One factor that encourages these types of delays and hampers efficient
administration is the lack of information technology within the judicial
systems. Computerization of routine tasks would not only make "the
processing of cases more efficient," but would significantly decrease the
opportunities for court personnel and judges to "request bribes for moving
cases along."' 172 For example, a recent study of Chilean and Ecuadorian
courts found that "increasing the use of computer monitoring
systems ... cause[s] a decrease in the reports of corrupt practices."'173 Thus,
in addition to providing for easier outside review of judicial decisions in
individual cases, the outside review made possible by computer monitoring
168 MacLean, supra note 150, at 156.
169 See BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 25.
170 Pdsara, supra note 124, at 88.
171 Koh, supra note 87.
172 BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 25-26.
173 Buscaglia & Dakolias, supra note 118, at 107.
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and access to decisions would help make legal decisions more consistent
within jurisdictions.
In contrast to the significance between information technology and
efficiency, a factor that does not apparently have a strong correlation to delay
is the number of judges in a jurisdiction. Studies have shown that "the
correlation between the number of judges per million inhabitants and
efficiency is low."'174 This makes sense when one considers that the current
judiciary has a built-in incentive to maintain current delays in order to
capitalize on maximum "rents." In other words, judicial reform solely based
on increasing the number of judges will not translate into decreased time to
disposition due to those built-in incentives. In contrast, an increase in judges
willing to decide cases expeditiously without requiring parties to resort to
bribery would translate into decreased time to disposition.
In sum, administrative deficiencies play a very large role in sustaining
the current inefficiency and ineffectiveness of Latin American judicial
systems. While in part a result of lack of financial resources, the most
significant problems arise from centralized management, lack of local control
and input, judicial passivity regarding case management, and in general, the
poor administrative skills of the judiciary. Any substantial reform effort must
be cognizant of the inherent opposition the current judiciary has towards that
reform. This is because the current judiciary has an enormous vested interest
in maintaining the status quo: decreased acceptance of rent seeking activities
will substantially decrease both their incomes and influence as judges. In
other words, administrative reform cannot be carried out by the current
"winners" of the judicial systems, because these players have no real
incentives to change the system. For these reasons, reform efforts must
"ensure that short-term benefits compensate for the loss of illicit rents
previously received by court officers responsible for implementing
changes."' 175 Only with these short-term benefits in place may a reform effort
hope to change the fundamental problems in the administration of judicial
systems. 176
174 BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 9 (citing Edgardo Buscaglia, A
Quantitative Assessment of the Judicial Systems in Latin America, presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, Berkeley, Cal., May
21-23, & 26, 1995).
175 Buscaglia & Dakolias, supra note 118, at 108.
176 Possible short-term benefits "include generous early retirement packages,
promotions for judges and support staff, new buildings and/or expanded budgets." Id. at
109.
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2. Judicial Independence
Judicial independence is said to be the cornerstone of any successful
reform.' 77 This independence encompasses freedom from interference from
other governmental bodies, from other judges within the system, and from
acceding to the wishes of political parties.' 78 According to Ely, the judiciary
itself is responsible for establishing and maintaining this independence,
because "one of the surest ways to acquire power is to assert it."'1 79 Without
this independence, studies demonstrate that legal uncertainty increases in
systems in which jurisprudence is often based more on political interference
than legal reasoning. 180 However, judicial independence in emerging
political systems may or may not be appropriate if the goal is judicial reform.
For example, an independent judiciary could be a benefit for judicial reform
or an impediment if that judiciary wishes to preserve rent seeking activities
for its own benefit. 18' The following is a discussion of the lack of judicial
independence in Latin America, and consequences this has for any
meaningful judicial reform.
Latin American judiciaries have traditionally been subservient to the
legislative and executive branches, and have no practical power to "clearly
define laws promulgated by the legislatures.' 182 This subservience dates back
to colonial times when the viceroy, or representative of the king, sat on the
superior judicial body and had substantial power to interpret the law.' 8 3 This
tradition currently manifests itself in legislative and executive interventions
in specific cases that only serve to "destroy public confidence and trust in the
judicial system."'18 4
177 See Edmundo Jarquin & Fernando Carrillo, Introduction, in JUSTICE DELAYED:
JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA vii (Edmundo Jarquin & Fernando Carrillo eds.,
1998).
178 Dakolias, supra note 161, at 172 (citing Owen M. Fiss, The Right Degree of
Independence, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF
JUDICIARY 55, 55-56 (Irwin P. Stotsky ed., 1993)).
179Id. at 173 n.17 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 47-48 (1980)).
180 See BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 26 (citing ALAN WATSON, THE
CIVIL LAW (1981)).
181 See id.
182 Id. at 13.
183 Id. at 12 n.32 (citing ALEJO CARPENTEROS M., HISTORIA JUDICIAL DE
LATINOAMERICA 15-16 (1978)).
184 Id. at 13.
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Unfortunately, many Latin American judiciaries are not free from
pressure from higher courts either. For example, judges from the Chilean
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals "call lower court judges and weigh in
with their opinion on certain cases." 185 Also in Chile, the Supreme Court
annually ranks all judges, giving the court a great deal of power over judicial
careers.1 86 Some of these rankings "have been interpreted as punishment of
lower court judges who have gone too far in contesting the Supreme Court's
holdings on human rights issues. ' 187 Finally, as shown in the discussion of
the Colombian judiciary's choice between plata o plomo in Section III,
political parties such as drug dealers and paramilitaries have an inordinate
amount of influence over judicial decisions.
Yet there are other factors that impinge upon judicial independence in
Latin America. For example, the lack of stare decisis and unclear
jurisdictional boundaries in terms of geography and subject matter have
translated into an inability of Latin judiciaries to "make objective and well-
reasoned decisions in order to hold the other two branches of government
accountable."' 88 Finally, low judicial salaries, inadequate or insecure
pensions, and ineffective disciplinary and appointment systems all contribute
to encourage and permit judges to not only accept and demand bribes but to
tailor their judicial opinions for financial gain.189
VI. MEDIATION AS A CATALYST FOR JUDICIAL REFORM
Given the above described violence and demonstrated inability of Latin
American judiciaries to control and channel the motivations behind that
violence into productive opportunities for change, the remainder of this
article will analyze the possibilities of mediation as a catalyst not only for
judicial reform, but also for societal change. Subpart A will discuss how
mediation can alleviate current systemic problems in Latin American legal
systems. Subpart B then describes mediation programs already in place
throughout Latin America highlighting procedural distinctions and their
causes.
185 Dakolias, Court Performance Around the World, supra note 134, at 114 (citing
Sergio Urrejola, Cambios requiridos en Chile, in LA EXIGENCIA DE JUSTICIA EN EL
MUNDO ACTUAL 38, 40 (1996)).
186 See MacLean, supra note 150, at 161.
187 Id.
188 BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 13.
189 See Dakolias, supra note 161, at 173-84.
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A. Theory of Mediation
According to Mares, Latin American fears of violence center on "the
survival of democratic systems." 190 The Central American Treaty for
Democratic Peace of 1995 identified four principles for ensuring peaceful
societies and maintaining these democratic systems:
* The rule of law;
* The strengthening and perfecting of democratic institutions;
* The subordination of the armed forces to constitutionally mandated
civilian authorities; and
* The maintenance of an active, flexible, and mutually collaborative
dialogue.' 9 1
Aside from the reference to armed forces, the remaining principles relate
directly to the themes of this article. That is, judicial reform encompasses the
rule of law and the reinforcement of democratic institutions, which, we will
show, can be strengthened and facilitated through mediation. Subsection A. I
explores mediation as an alternative to a corrupt judicial system, paying
particular concern to the role of mediation in current and future judicial
reforms. Yet mediation goes beyond structural reform of the judicial system.
Societal changes are also possible through the judicious use of mediation as a
tool to establish and maintain collaborative dialogue. Accordingly,
Subsection A.2 fleshes out this idea of mediation as a mechanism for
collaborative dialogue to establish and maintain a culture of non-violent and
constructive social interaction in Latin America. Finally, by allowing for an
official alternative to the current judicial system, mediation can strengthen
public trust in that system and in government in general. Subsection A.3
analyzes mediation from this perspective, and demonstrates how effective
court mediation programs can increase public confidence in the system.
1. Mediation as an Alternative to a Corrupt Judicial System
Acknowledging that the situation in Latin America regarding judicial
inadequacies is serious, many countries are attempting to implement reforms
that will revitalize and legitimatize the legal system. For example, many
countries have established judicial councils to nominate judges, establish and
190 See MARES, supra note 1.
191 Id. (citing FRANCISCO ROJAS ARAVENA, CENTROAMERICA: NUEVA AGENDA DE
SEGURIDAD 7).
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enforce professional standards, and determine budgetary needs.192 Others
have passed procedural reforms to help hold judges publicly accountable for
their decisions. 193 However, as discussed earlier, these reforms are at odds
with judicial rent seeking activities, and as such cannot be expected to have
immediate success without a drastic overhaul of the current judiciary. For
example, although legal education regarding public rights is essential for
improving access to the courts, many court officials "consider a public that is
aware of its legal rights a threat to their rent seeking activities." 194 Therefore,
meaningful reform of legal aid services cannot be accomplished while judges
continue to demand these destructive bribes.
Although mediation itself will not solve the systemic deficiencies in
Latin American judicial systems, it may be "the most immediately viable
response[]" to the corruption, inefficiency, and damage to most Latin
courts. 195 Essentially, viable mediation programs allow the public to bypass
"the corruption and delays of the formal justice system, thus reducing
judicial caseloads and opportunities for rent seeking."' 9 6 In Chile and
Ecuador, a study done on corruption and its causes in the judicial system
demonstrated that the introduction of private sector mediation and arbitration
in those countries reduced judicial corruption by a substantial amount.197
Because most of Latin America is precluded from using the formal
justice system in that they cannot afford to pay the substantial bribes to
judicial officials, mediation could also substantially increase access to
justice. 198 This would have the greatest impact on the poor, since they would
have recourse to an official dispute resolution process for perhaps the first
time. In addition, emerging businesses often forego bringing cases to court
because their financial constraints preclude them from offering the
mandatory bribes. Because of this inability to have recourse to the judicial
system, many "are deterred from entering a market."1 99 Mediation would
allow these businesses to have some forum for relief.
Gender also plays a role in lack of access in Latin America. Because
women are much more likely to be illiterate, "they have a much lower level
192 BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 31.
193 Id. at 29.
194 Id. at 31.
195 Ratliff & Buscaglia, supra note 120, at 68.
196 Id. at 69.
197 Buscaglia & Dakolias, supra note 118, at 107.
198 Dakolias, supra note 161, at 200.
199 BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 35.
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of knowledge about their legal rights and the judicial system." 200 For
example, Peruvian women constitute seventy-three percent of the illiterate
population.201 And in Chile, a survey "found that 30.5 % of the women, as
compared to 21.7 % of the men, did not know their legal rights." 202 Coupled
with the fact that domestic cases constitute over one-third of judicial
caseloads throughout Latin America and the majority of clients of legal aid
offices are women, 20 3 this lack of legal knowledge results in severe
disadvantages for Latin American women. In addition, at least one country
has until recently "prevented spouses from bringing legal actions in
courts." 204 Because of these disadvantages, many Latin American
governments are establishing mediation programs for family cases.
According to some scholars, however, "[a]lthough ADR may not be the ideal
mechanism given the imbalance of power, it may be the only justice
available to women." 20 5
Unfortunately, although mediation may permit parties to circumvent
corrupt judicial systems, the judiciary may initially feel quite threatened by
the existence of court mediation programs. For example, they may feel that
these programs threaten their power and influence over the system, and may
even be concerned that the program may divert possible opportunities for
rent seeking. Nonetheless, some scholars posit that these judges may
eventually "come to rely on [mediation administrators] for their skills as
professional managers." 206 Lightened caseloads may also help alter these
opinions. Finally, court mediation and the existence of mediation
administrators may force judges to concentrate more on their important
decision-making powers, and less on their more lucrative administrative
duties.207 In other words, court mediation programs may encourage the
judiciary to delegate administrative responsibilities.
200 Dakolias, supra note 161, at 213 (citing COMISION PERMANENTE DE LOS
DERECHOS DE LA MUJER Y DEL NINO, INFORME NACIONAL SOBRE LA MUJER 71-72
(1995)).
201 Id. at 213 n.201
202 Id. at 213.
203 Id. at 213-14.
204 Id. at 216 n.210.
2 05 Id. at 216.
206 BUSCAGLIA JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 33.
207 Id. at 33.
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2. Mediation as a Mechanism for Collaborative Dialogue
Shonholtz has defined democracy's underlying mission as "the creation
of acceptable, fair, and neutral venues and forums for the peaceful expression
of conflict. '20 8 In a well functioning democracy, conflict between groups
stimulates creative thought and encourages parties to find responsive and
thoughtful resolutions. According to de Tocqueville, a properly functioning
democratic society fosters the "delimitation of government prerogatives and
[creates] a context for constraining arbitrary or intrusive state power. '20 9
Conflict resolution is the natural vehicle for this properly functioning society,
since the process of identifying and addressing conflict enables governments
to understand the needs and desires of their citizens. Such understanding of
the nuances to a conflict makes possible targeted governmental action to
bring about needed social change. In a sense, "social change produces
conflicts and conflicts bring about social change." 210
However, conflict can become destructive when governments fail to
respond to changing needs of society, and when social and political
"structures perpetrate social injustices against different sectors of the
society."' 211 It is in societies in which conflict has traditionally been defined
as violent or bad that conflict becomes something to be feared and avoided at
all costs. In the context of societies currently transforming themselves from
authoritarianism to more participatory forms of governance, "the zones of
conflict" that societies encounter may actually increase. 212 This is because in
authoritarian societies conflict is stifled, and decisions are made by officials
without systematic discussion and input from below. In contrast, in
democratic societies, people are the instigators of change and may express
their disagreement in nonviolent and official ways through dialogue, voting,
and peaceful protest. For these reasons, societies in transition to democracies
208 Raymond Shonholtz, The Mediating Future, 552 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 139,,140 (1997).
209 Carlos L. Yorddn, Instituting Problem Solving Processes As a Means of
Constructive Social Change, 1.4 ONLINE J. PEACE & CONFLICT RESOL. 5, 10 (last
visited Mar. 16, 1999), available at http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/l_4yordan.htm
(quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, cited in Andrew Levin, Civil Society and
Democratization in Haiti, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 389, 400 (1995))
210 Yordin, supra note 209, 3.
211 Id. 2.
212 Robert C. Schehr & Dragan Milovanovic, Conflict Mediation and the
Postmodern: Chaos, Catastrophe, and Psychoanalytic Semiotics, 26 SOC. JUST. 208, 225
(citing R. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY (1987)), available at 1999 WL 25869925.
[Vol. 18:3 2003]
MEDIATION AS A CATALYST
will actually experience greater opportunities for expressing their
disagreement than before. This both increases the need for nonviolent and
effective forums, and increases the risk of societal disintegration if these
forums are not available.
In Latin America, the history of violent confrontation and
authoritarianism has resulted in a scarcity of legitimate and non-threatening
forums for the peaceful resolution of societal and individual conflicts.
Although not all countries have been exposed to civil or external war,
governmental corruption and private vigilantism throughout the region have
resulted in an unofficial "war" between governments and their citizens. That
is, deeply felt public mistrust of government and the inability of the judiciary
to stem both governmental and private violence towards marginalized
populations has brought about an environment of such hostility and danger
that manifestations of further violence are increasingly common.
According to a Nicaragua group operating under the auspices of the
International Commission of Support and Verification and the Organization
of American States, transforming these societies into viable and peaceful
environments requires a comprehensive, four-part approach to conflict
resolution.2 13 The group based these recommendations on the needs of post-
war Latin American societies with established international peace missions.
The four-part approach hinges on participation by marginalized groups for its
success. First, "mediation, conflict resolution, human rights protection, and
violence-deterrence" are needed to support and sustain the peace process, in
part by strengthening state institutions and civil organizations. 2 14 Second,
civil organizations and popular constituencies must participate individually
and collectively in any conflict resolution process.2 15 In other words, to be
effective and sustainable, conflict resolution processes must be participatory
at all levels of society, and not used exclusively by state officials.
Thirdly, "the local peasant communities [must] become participants in
the peace process, not just objects. '216 However, in order for these
communities to become true participants, attention must be paid to their
organizational development. That is, local communities must be allowed and
213 See MARES, supra note 1, n.42 (citing Comisi6n Internacional de Apoyo y
Verificaci6n CIA V/OEA, in Proceso de Paz en Nicaragua: Verificacion de Derechos
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encouraged to develop and strengthen their local governments in order for
them to be effective participants. Without their effective participation,
conflict resolution processes will not be able to "respond to the specific
needs of the people in the most efficient, practical, and realistic manner."217
Finally, peace should stimulate the growth of these peasant groups, and
afford them an atmosphere conducive to the development of self-
representation. 218
Thus, by utilizing mediation in this way, mediation can act as a unifying
process by bringing disparate groups together to work collectively to
establish peace in war torn societies. However, mediation is also integral to
establishing and sustaining democratic forms of governments, regardless of
whether that society is post-war or in a relatively peaceful transition to
democracy. For instance, when discussing adopting mediation techniques in
post-soviet Russia, a North American mediator stated that learning mediation
techniques is "taking the first step toward democracy .... When you are
resolving disputes, you are governing yourself."219 Because democracy is
founded on the fundamental idea of political negotiation through compromise
and problem solving,220 it can be seen "as the development of the legitimacy
of laws and the reasonableness of individuals" to understand that "several
truths can exist simultaneously." 221
Mediation is ideally suited to helping parties understand these truths,
since an effective mediation forces people to listen to one another and allows
them to hear those thoughts and feelings through the neutral language of the
mediator. Essentially, mediation enables people to develop constructive
methods of communication, 222 so that even if no resolution is reached at the
session, parties will hopefully internalize these constructive skills so that
217 Id.
218 Id
219 Around the World: Briefs, 7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 130 (1996).
220 Eric Brazil, S.F. 's Great Peacemaker Takes on Europe Community Boards
Founder Teaches New Democracies how to Compromise, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 27, 1992,
at B3, available at 1992 WL 7608584 (founder Raymond Shonholtz states that "The
deepest reality is that you can't run a democracy without negotiating."); see also Michael
T. Kaufman et al., Dissidents-Then and Now, TRANSITION, Feb. 21, 1997 at 7, available
at http://ella.sirs.com.
221 Dusan Ondrusek & Vladimir Labath, Conflicts in Transforming Society and the
Nongovernmental Sector: The Slovak Example, 552 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 40, 41 (1997) (positing that open dialog about these differing truths is necessary to
the continuance of democracy).
222 Azcarate, supra note 83.
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future conflicts may be peacefully resolved. At the very least, participants
will have heard the views and concerns of the other side, and will understand
those concerns to an extent not realized previously.
In addition to the more familiar, individual-focused court mediation
programs, an unofficial multiparty mediation process called interactive
conflict resolution has been developed. 223 The model uses a panel of scholars
and practitioners to act as mediators and facilitators and provide substantive
knowledge for the parties. This substantive knowledge encompasses dispute
resolution theory, but is essentially based on the panelists' ability to "explain
the origin and escalation of the conflict [in question] through comparison
with other conflicts." 224 Using academicians rather than the government
officials circumvents the long-standing public mistrust of government, and
provides participants with panelists they can hopefully respect. This is
because Latin American academia has traditionally been an arena in which
free expression and thought is encouraged, and where those at odds with the
government have been accepted.
Similar to the four-part Nicaraguan approach, interactive conflict
resolution relies on expanding the number of participants. For example,
rather than negotiation only between official representatives of groups in a
conflict, interactive conflict resolution encourages participation by influential
representatives such as "scholars, politicians, army generals, ex-presidents,
journalist[s], popular leaders and businessmen. '225 The goal of interactive
conflict resolution is to utilize this goodwill towards academics, and help
parties learn to communicate effectively with each other "with the hope that
this communication will produce deeper understanding, mutual recognition
and respect and possible hypothetical solutions to the conflict.
226
Essentially, like mediation, interactive conflict resolution aims to change the
learned behaviors of "violence and prejudicial thinking" to "peaceful and
cooperative thinking."227
223 Id.
224 Id. (citing Roger Fisher, in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS:
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3. Mediation as a Spur to Increase Public Confidence in the
System
As described in Section III.A, public mistrust in the judiciary and in
government permeates every aspect of Latin American society. Any
meaningful judicial reform must make acquiring and sustaining the public's
trust a fundamental goal, or those reforms will eventually, and perhaps even
spectacularly, fail. Implementation of effective court mediation programs
may help the state attain this goal. According to Judge Wayne Brazil, a high-
quality court mediation program "increases the public's confidence in and
respect for our system of justice and, by giving the parties a service they
really value, increases their sense of gratitude toward the government and
their sense of connection to our society. '228 This gratitude, in turn, helps the
public accept "the legitimacy of having democratically developed norms
govern relations within our country. '229
Unofficial mediation can also encourage sustained judicial reform, but
through indirect channels. According to Judge Helen Highton of the National
Civil Court of Appeals of Argentina, "there is [in Argentina] no culture nor
practice in favor of settlement, consensus and conciliation, so creating a
frame in which to discourage litigation as the only way to resolve disputes, is
relevant. '230 Essentially, these mediations can work to encourage a more
democratic and participatory society by teaching parties how to communicate
with each other effectively. These societal changes can build a reservoir of
citizens able to interact effectively and nonviolently. In turn, the citizens will
be more able to effectively negotiate their conflicts, and correspondingly
more able to understand and assert their legal rights to a fair and effective
judicial system. This undercurrent of citizens well versed in conflict
resolution and legally savvy regarding their political and legal rights will put
pressure on both the judicial system and government, in general, to change to
suit their now identified needs. In short, effective mediation programs can
encourage democratic modes of communication, and enable parties to begin
228 Brazil, supra note 127, at 738 (arguing that a high-quality court mediation
program with paid court mediators is the most effective model for courts).
229 Id.
230 Helen Highton, Role of Dispute Resolution in Judicial Reform: North American
Input in the National Mediation in Argentina, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACROSS THE
CONTINENTS: 22ND ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 217, 238 (James B. Boskey &
Douglas M. McCabe eds., 1994).
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to understand how to function efficiently in a democratic society. Essentially,
mediation programs "prioritize consensus." 231
B. Description of Actual Mediation Programs in Place
In 1993, the Inter-American Bar Association resolved to recommend to
their national bar associations that mediation in family law disputes should
be promoted and encouraged.232 In addition, they proposed continuing legal
education for judges and lawyers regarding family mediation. 233 The
Association noted that Argentina and Colombia had already established such
programs, and stated that these processes were a "fundamental and
irreplaceable pillar" of any judicial system.234 This section describes current
and past mediation programs in Latin America. Unfortunately, information
about these programs is difficult to obtain, and in many cases only brief
references are available. For example, in 1995 Dakolias wrote that Chile had
a "70 percent success rate for mediation proceedings," yet specific
information about these proceedings is unavailable. 235 Similarly, Dakolias
writes that the El Salvadorian Procuraduria settled a majority of mediated
cases regarding child support and alimony in less than two months.236
However, no further information is available. Finally, many countries already
possess the legal framework for mediation in their Codes of Civil Procedure,
but have not yet established any mediation programs. 237
Accordingly, this section concentrates on describing and analyzing
mediation programs for which substantial information exists. Specifically,
B. 1 describes Capital University's efforts in Nicaragua, in which the
University co-sponsored experimental mediation programs and trained local
mediators with country-specific training materials. Similarly B.2 discusses
Argentina's established and thriving court and community programs, while
B.3 involves USAID-sponsored court mediation in Ecuador, and B.4
231 Supreme Court of Ohio, Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, I ENCUENTRO
INTERAMERICANO SOBRE RESOLUCION ALTERNATIVA DE DISPUTAs 21 (1993).
232 The Inter-American Bar Association: Resolutions of the XXX Conference, 25 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 161,180 (1993).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Dakolias, supra note 161, at 200.
236 Id. at 202.
237 Id.
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describes Colombia's National Conciliation Program, a process very similar
to mediation.
In addition to pure mediation as we know it in North America, many
Latin American countries have both informal and formal Justice of the Peace
systems. These systems are in many aspects very similar to mediation.
Section B.5 analyzes one of these systems in Peru, concluding that Justice of
the Peace systems are an attractive adaptation of mediation that resonate with
traditional practices in many Latin American countries. Finally, B.6
discusses Bolivia's seven hundred year-old tradition of "sponsorship," a form
of interfamilial mediation.
1. Nicaragua
In 1993, Nicaraguan mediators mediated over four hundred disputes in a
variety of settings, including "divorce and child custody, landlord/tenant,
labor grievances, petty crimes and nuisance problems." 238 The mediators
were trained by the Center for Dispute Resolution at the Capital University
Law and Graduate Center, and included "judges, attorneys, police officers,
labor department officials, social workers, psychologists, teachers, pastors
and priests."239 The training was the result of several trips by Capital
personnel to meet with governmental officials, pastors and priests, police,
courts and local bar, the Legal Office for Women, and a law school dean.240
Representatives from these groups worked jointly with Capital personnel to
adapt "mediation training programs and materials to the Nicaraguan
culture." 241 Although eventually over sixty mediators were trained by Capital
personnel, initial offerings were limited to representatives from the above
groups. In 1994, Capital co-sponsored a permanent mediation office with the
law school at the National University of Nicaragua in Leon.242 Employing a
full-time director, the office "offers mediation trainings," and supervises over
forty cases per month.243
238 Roberta S. Mitchell & Scott E. Dewhirst, Designing Mediation Models and
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2. Argentina
In Argentina, public opinion rated corruption as the second most pressing
problem facing citizens in 1999.244 When implementing court annexed
mediation in Argentina, a primary motivation was the perceived corruption
"and a desire to put into place a new system for the resolution of conflict. '245
In 1991, a newly formed Mediation Commission from the Ministry of Justice
was given the go-ahead to draw up a National Mediation Plan. This plan
included "the creation of a mediator corps, a school for mediators, and a pilot
scheme in civil law administration. '246 North American mediators were
invited to Argentina to give mediation trainings, so that by 1992 Argentina
had certified sixty mediators.247 Of the sixty mediators, ten were chosen in
1994 to establish a Mediation Center authorized in the civil law pilot
scheme.248 This Center operates under ethical standards similar to those in
place in North American mediation programs, and accepts cases referred
either by the parties or by judges. 249 Soon after the establishment of the
Center, the Supreme Court of Argentina joined with the Ministry of Justice to
implement mediation, and the project expanded to ten courts. 250 Following
the lead of many North American programs, the Center gave mediation
training and education to those courts' "[j]udges, court secretaries, and
Juvenile Court advisers. 251
In addition to these established court programs, the Center provides
training courses for interior provinces, and "offers mediation internships in
urban district centers. '252 In 1994, the Center had a sixty-five percent
settlement rate overall, with a seventy percent settlement rate in family and
patrimonial cases. 253 This is in spite of the fact that judges refer "the most
difficult cases or those that have already been in the judicial system for five
to eight years to the mediation center. 254
244 See Buscaglia & Dakolias, supra note 118, at 113.
245 Shonholtz, supra note 208, at 142.
246 See Alvarez, supra note 135, at 84.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 85.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 86.
252 Id. at 87.
253 Dakolias, supra note 161, at 202.
2 5 4 Id.
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In 1995, Argentina statutorily established mandatory mediation. 255 The
statute requires that parties to mediation be represented by counsel, and
keeps mediation proceedings confidential. 256 For cases referred from a court,
the mediator must have a law degree and be on a national register maintained
by the Ministry of Justice.257 Specifically, cases referred from a judge must
be mediated by lawyers with four years of seniority and certification as a
mediator.258 Co-mediators in these cases must have a psychology or social
work degree plus four years of experience. 259 Finally, if parties settle, they
are responsible for the mediator's fees, but if they do not settle, the
"mediator's fee is paid out a special state fund."'260 Because corruption in the
judicial systems results in almost mandatory bribing of officials, although
parties have a slight monetary reward for failure to settle, (i.e. mediator fees
paid by the state) they are still better off financially if they settle and avoid
endless delays and expenses of litigation.
In 1997, the legislature decided to give further impetus to parties to use
mediation. A statute was enacted for federal and local courts in Buenos Aires
City that allowed parties who paid settlements arising out of mediation or
negotiation to forego paying the mandatory tax of three percent required if
the party had paid after judicial resolution.261 For example, if a court ordered
Party B to pay Party A the equivalent of $10,000 dollars as damages in a
medical malpractice suit brought by Party A, Party A would be statutorily
required to pay a three percent tax on the amount. Law 24,573 allows parties
who have secured settlements in mediation to avoid paying this tax.
However, if the court is required to enforce the settlement, the tax cannot be
avoided.262 In addition, the statute allows parties to negotiate without regard
255 Salvador J. Juncadella, Relationships Between the Supreme Courts and the
Lawyers Associations, 42 ST. Louis U. L. J. 1089, 1093 (1998).
256 See Ethan S. Burger et al., Making Mediation Work in Russia and Ukraine: The
Need for an Appropriate Legal Framework, 16 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF
LITIG. 171, 173 (1998).
257 Id.
258 See Gladys Stella Alvarez, Court Connected Mediation Program and Argentine
Judicial System-A Pilot Experience in Civil Justice, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACROSS
THE CONTINENTS, supra note 230, at 243.
259 See id.
260 Burger et al., supra note 256, at 174.
261 See Emilio Ignacio Hardoy & Jorge O'Reilly, Practitioners Perspective: Recent
Regulations Reduce The Cost Of Litigation, LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP., July 31, 1997,
available at 1997 WL 9499118.
262 Id.
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to legal precedent. 263 Although insurance companies were dismayed, because
of the possibility of avoiding the tax "[c]laims that seldom [are] brought to
court because of the small amount" were, in 1997, "flooding mediation
rooms."
2 6 4
Also in 1997, the Mediation Center expanded to include a Community
Mediation Program in Buenos Aires, with the goal of "harmoniz[ing]
neighborly coexistence, improv[ing the] quality of life, and creat[ing] a
change in attitudes." 265 The Program is composed of sixteen centers and has
thirty-two mediators hired by the city.266 As of 1999, the Program had
handled nearly 1500 mediation requests, with 969 cases mediated and more
than 600 resolved.267 The Program expanded into multiparty mediation, "in
which groups of residents discuss solutions for neighborhood problems with
institutions or businesses." 268 For example, one successful mediation
involved garbage "accumulating at a site adjacent to the railroad track" in a
residential neighborhood. 269 The garbage collection company and a railroad
service had denied full responsibility, but in a mediated settlement involving
area residents and the companies, the garbage collection company and the
railroad agreed to jointly clean and collect the waste. 270 Finally, in addition
to these efforts, mediators at the Program have begun teaching conflict
resolution in primary and secondary schools. Their goal is to "reduce the
level of violence, and strengthen democratic and participatory values. 271
3. Ecuador
In 1999, USAID identified United State's national interests in Ecuador as
"the preservation of political stability and peace in the region," and "the
strengthening of democratic institutions in order to reduce threats to the
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Marcela Valente, Rights-Argentina: Mediation Resolves Neighborhood
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democratic process." 272 Citing endemic corruption and a corresponding
growing demand for "a more responsive and accountable government" from
civil society organizations in Ecuador, USAID and the government of
Ecuador launched an initiative in 1999 to provide court mediation to "fill the
void created by ineffective government institutions." 273 Caseload concerns
are also cited as instrumental in implementing these programs. 274 In addition,
private mediation for business concerns has been established, as well as "less
formal, community-based approaches for conflict resolution with indigenous
communities and other organizations working with the poor."275
The World Bank also supports initiatives to provide legal services and
mediation to underserved populations. 276 Women's legal service centers in
Quito and Guayaquil offer legal aid, including mediation representation, as
well as medical and psychological services. 277 Center personnel include staff
lawyers, psychologists, and medical assistants. Although data for mediation
sessions is uncertain, the Quito program provided legal services to over 641
women in 2000, resulting in 100 new cases. 278
In addition, recently established women's centers in Duale and Santa
Elena provide services to an average of thirty women per day in a population
of 80,000 and 100,000 respectively.279 Each center staffs two lawyers, two
psychologists, and two social workers, and fourteen mediators are shared
between the centers. 280 In addition to providing legal representation, the
centers provide shelter, educate women on the laws, and draft and advocate
for domestic violence statutes.281 Training and prevention of domestic
violence and violence in general is also offered to clients, families, religious
groups, and students. 282
272 USAID, USAID Congressional Presentation 1999: Ecuador, available at
http://www.info.usaid.gov/pubs/cp99/lac/ec.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 1999).
273 Id.; see also Jaime Espinoza Ramirez & Esteban Moreno, Judicial Reform in
Ecuador, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 192 (Malcolm
Rowat et al. eds.),World Bank Technical Paper No. 280 (1995).
274 USAID, supra note 272.
275 Id.
276 Dakolias, supra note 137, at S39.
277 Id. at S40.
278 Id.
279 Id. at S40-41.
280 Id. at S41.
281 Id. at S42.
282 Id.
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4. Colombia's Conciliation Program
In Colombia, efforts to introduce mediation have resulted in Article 116
of the 1991 Colombian Constitution, which vests citizens with the power of
administering justice on a temporary basis.283 Conciliation, as used in
Colombia, is mediation as it is understood here in the United States.
Colombia's system is three-tiered. The first tier consists of the administrative
agencies of the Colombian Family Welfare Institute, which is authorized to
conciliate family issues.284 The second tier is court conciliation by judges,
before or during trial, while the third tier is comprised of private conciliation
centers. 285 As of 1993, Colombia had ninety-two private conciliation centers
authorized by the Ministry of Justice. 286 Each center is required to have one
hundred members and be functional for two years.2 87 Four centers are located
in universities and two in bar associations.288
Training for mediators is mandatory, and it is offered by the Ministry of
Justice. 289 . In addition to general mediation and conflict settlement
techniques, training sessions can include discussions on specific legal areas
such as civil, labor, family, administrative, and criminal, as well as legal and
administrative aspects of running a conciliation center.290 In addition to
family matters (legal separations, child custody and visitation, and alimony
issues), conciliation has been used in agricultural cases and contract
disputes. 291 Radio advertising, flyers, and community presentations are used
to promote the training.292
283 Dr. Sandro Verano, Director, National Conciliation Program, I ENCUENTRO
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288 Dr. Marta Eugenia Lescano, Coordinator of the Conciliation Program, Ministry
of Justice, District of Antioquia, 1 ENCUENTRO INTERAMERICANO SOBRE RESOLUCION
ALTERNATIVA DE DISPUTAs 63 (1993).
289 Vevano, supra note 283, at 60.
290 Dr. Damaris Blandona Aristizaba, Regional Conciliation Coordinator of the El
Valle and Cauca Departments, 1 ENCUENTRO INTERAMERICANO SOBRE RESOLUCION
ALTERNATIVA DE DISPUTAs 62 (1993).
291 Verano, supra note 283, at 60.
292 Aristizaba, supra note 290, at 62.
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A pilot program in the beginning stages in 1993 established
neighborhood centers in five cities.293 The pilot program has four stages. The
first stage involves the training of mediators and is done through the means
outlined above. 294 The program establishes the centers in highly populated
areas with low economic resources and poor access to the justice system, 295
perhaps due to preliminary data from the private conciliation centers that
found conciliation to be most successful in the poorer areas in terms of
settlement rates and numbers of conciliations. For instance, neighborhoods
like Guadalupe and Palmeras had a settlement rate of one hundred percent,
while in high middle class neighborhoods "the lawyer reads the paper and
does not conciliate. 296 Finally, the program has an evaluation stage.297
5. Peru's Justice of the Peace System
Like many Latin American countries, Peru is a heterogeneous country
with diverse ethnic groups such as Spanish, peasant, and indigenous
communities.298 However, Peru's justice system is perceived as one that not
only fails to recognize the distinct cultural and social realities of peasant and
indigenous litigants, but also requires them to express themselves in Spanish
even though many of them speak only rudimentary Spanish, if any at all.299
In addition to these fundamental concerns, endless delays and corruption
have resulted in a public that views judges as unjust and immoral grafters. 300
The Justice of the Peace system, established through Judicial Organic
Law, Article 61, provides official justice for these peasant and indigenous
groups. Every population center within Peru has at least one justice of the
peace. 30 1 The system relies on local justices elected by their communities to
supplement the broader program. 302 Although the position is non-
293 Verano, supra note 283, at 60-61.
294 Id. at 61.
295 Id.
296 Lescano, supra note 288, at 64.
297 Verano, supra note 283, at 60.
298 Brandt, supra note 15, at 92-93.
299 Id. at 93.
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compensatory, serving is considered an honor. 303 Seventy percent of the
justices are not legally trained, but all are local residents and "generally
[belong] to the same social class as the parties to a conflict .. .. 304 Similar
to conciliators, they "often have little or no formal training in resolving
disputes, and propose solutions until the parties agree on one."305
Although the Justices are legally required to follow the law, many cases
revolve around non-legal issues that do not rise to a cause of action in official
courts. 306 This occurs even though the justice officially has jurisdiction for
only the following types of cases: "monies due and owing; support and
alimony matters; urgent, temporary intervention with juveniles who
committed antisocial acts; evictions; and injunctions governing personal
property. '30 7 For example, couples often come before a justice of the peace
for "jealousy or nonfulfillment of domestic obligations." 308 The justice is
required by custom and tradition to listen to the two sides and come up with
the solution based not only on law, but also on "the culture and customs of
the locality. 30 9 Because the justice is not limited to legal claims, he or she
can act more as a mediator to help the parties resolve underlying personal
issues and begin "at the source of the conflict in order to promote a lasting
social peace." 310
Roughly forty-seven percent of all cases in Peru, with the exclusion of
Lima, are handled by justices of the peace, with sixty-three percent of those
litigants satisfied with actions taken by the justice. 311 In addition to
familiarity with language, litigant satisfaction is bolstered by simple
procedures, low cost, accessibility, and the perception that the justice of the
peace is honest and just. For traditional communities, membership of the
justice in the community affords the community a measure of social control,
since families and neighborhoods are more interconnected and closely knit
than modern communities, in which people tend to move around with more
frequency, and not know their neighbors. 312 These traditional communities
303 Id.
304 Id. at 93-94.
305 Id.
306 Id. at 94.
307 Id. at 93.
308 Id. at 94.
309 Id. at 93.
310 Id. at 94.
311 Id. at 95.
312 Id. at 95-96.
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have higher rates of dispute settlement than more modem ones, perhaps due
to the desire to use conciliation to maintain equilibrium in their complex
social relationships. 313 (For more discussion on the ability of the traditional
community to manage conflicts, see the introduction to Section II, supra.)
6. Bolivia's Tradition of "Sponsorship"
The Aymara culture in Bolivia supports a very old form of mediation
called sponsorship, "in which the sponsor of a married couple clearly
participates in the resolution of conflicts without imposing any position."314
Similar to a mediator, the sponsor brings the family together so that they may
listen and be heard and helps them resolve their problems.315 Because
Bolivia's urban communities are experiencing tremendous rural-urban
migratory flow, current police and judicial systems are unable to adequately
service the areas. 316 For example, while the city of El Alto has a population
of 400,000, its police force consists of only 200 men.317 Instead of allowing
their communities to disintegrate due to these tremendously inadequate
services, the largely traditional and formerly rural families are combating
possible violence with the "sponsorship" tradition.
V. CONCLUSION
At the first inter-American meeting on alternative dispute resolution held
in Buenos Aires in 1993, it was clear from the reports of the sixteen countries
represented at the meeting that the movement for adoption of mediation is
universal in its appeal. Where formal court programs are established,
mediation offers access to the institutions of the justice system. Where ADR
is manifested in neighborhood justice centers, as in Argentina, or conciliation
centers, as established throughout Columbia, the goal of the activity is the
same-providing citizens with a place and a process for the peaceful
resolution of their disputes. All participants agreed that factors such as cost,
313 See id.
314 Gaston Mejia Brown, I ENCUENTRO INTERAMERICANO SOBRE RESOLUCION
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timeliness, and level of satisfaction of the disputing parties were fundamental
elements that drove the acceptance of mediation. 318
Whether the economy and political system of a North American, Central
American, or South American country is robust and stable or depressed and
volatile, the benefits of mediation are consistent. Many of the laws and
programs are strikingly similar, yet some are uniquely Latin American, such
as Bolivia's sponsorship tradition and the Justice of the Peace programs in
Peru. Notwithstanding any differences, the perspectives of the Buenos Aires
participants coalesced to produce goals and purposes that are inter-American.
That would not be a profound conclusion if it were not such a dramatic
contrast with the other conclusions of this article regarding the inefficiencies
and abuses in most of the judicial systems in Latin America.
Every society that has adopted a democratic system of government has
recognized that the stability of all democratic institutions rests upon a justice
system founded on principles of equal access, impartiality, and
independence. The Honorable Gladys Stella Alvarez of Argentina, a leading
proponent of Argentina's mediation programs, speaks of mediation's
"essentially democratic nature," and of its capacity to bring about a
"paradigmatic social change" from litigation and violence to "pacification
and cooperation. '319 The varieties of mediation processes discussed in this
paper can directly affect the very serious problems of systemic corruption in
the judicial system, violence, and an inability to communicate peacefully
within society at large. For example, court mediation programs operated
under the aegis of the judicial system can allow parties to circumvent corrupt
practices and resolve their disputes in a timely and efficient manner.
Moreover, the intensity of interest and participation of citizens in their
government is determined in large measure by the intensity of their trust for
governmental institutions. The creation of that trust is particularly difficult in
countries with a history of abuse of political power and disincentives for
public participation in the resolution of important decisions. Mediation
should be most attractive in those circumstances because it gives to the
individual a measure of control over his or her own destiny.
318 Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, Observations from notes taken as speaker and
participant in the 1993 Conference (on file with authors).
319 See Alvarez, supra note 135, at 79.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION IVol. 18:3 20031
